Abstract: This paper analyzes a simple model that captures the relationship between institutional quality, the shadow economy and corruption. It shows that an improvement in institutional quality reduces the shadow economy and affects the corruption market. The exact relationship between corruption and institutional quality is, however, ambiguous and depends on the relative effectiveness of the institutional quality in the shadow and corruption markets. The predictions of the model are empirically testedby means of Structural Equation Modelling that treats the shadow economy and the corruption market as latent variables-using data from OECD countries. The results show that an improvement in institutional quality reduces the shadow economy directly and corruption both directly and indirectly (through its effect on the shadow market).
1 Introduction 'Just as it is impossible not to taste the honey (or the poison) that finds itself at the tip of the tongue, so it is impossible for a government servant not to eat up, at least, a bit of the king's revenue.' 1 Corruption, by which we mean the abuse of public power for private gains, has always been present, in one form or another.
2 It is, in general, thought to be endemic, pervasive and a significant contributor to low economic growth, to distortionary investment and provision of public services, and to increase inequality to such an extent that international organizations like the World Bank have identified corruption as 'the single greatest obstacle to economic and social development' (World Bank, 2001 ). More recently, the World Bank has estimated that more than US$ 1 trillion is paid in bribes each year and that countries that tackle corruption, improve governance and the rule of law could increase per capita incomes by a staggering 400 percent (World Bank, 2004) .
One has to recognize, though, that this argument is not supported unanimously. Routine corruption may be efficiency enhancing. As Leff (1964) puts it: 'If the government has erred in its decision, the course made possible by corruption may well be the better one, ' (p. 11) . Corruption may also 'grease the wheels' in the rigid public administration. As Huntington (1968) notes: 'In terms of economic growth, the only thing worse than a society with a rigid, over-centralized, dishonest bureaucracy is one with a rigid, over-centralized, honest bureaucracy, ' (p. 386) .
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An important, and surprisingly, unexplored element of corruption is its relationship with the shadow economy. Clearly, corruption and shadow economy share a common characteristic: they are both, in general, illegal. The shadow economy it is widely believed, and existing estimates also confirm, to be both pervasive and significant. 4 It is not difficult for one to be convinced that there are important reasons why policy makers should be concerned with the existence of the shadow economy; for example, erosion of tax and social security bases might cause significantly large budget deficits, and policies based on unreliable indicators of the size of the shadow economy may render these policies ineffective.
In understanding the relationship of corruption with the shadow economy it is
important to understand what causes the shadow economy. With the risk of oversimplification, two schools of thought can be identified. One school of thought identifies high tax and social security burdens as the principal causes. 5 Economic agents, the story goes,
are not willing to pay high taxes and so are driven out of the official economy. 6 The second school of thought identifies institutional quality-bureaucracy, regulatory discretion, rule of law, corruption and a weak legal system-as the main causes of driving economic agents underground. This view is based on the presumption that the Leviathan government is not (sufficiently) constitutionally constrained and, hence, uses its coercive powers to exploit the citizenry. The natural response of economic agents to this government behaviour is to go underground losing all publicly provided benefits. Clearly, then, there is a potential relationship between corruption (and the misbehavior of government in general) and the shadow economy. But what is the precise relationship? Is it that a high corruption leads to high unofficial economy and so they are complements, or to less, so they are substitutes? Theoretically, both types of relationship may stand. Indeed, Choi and Thum (2004) show that the shadow economy mitigates government-induced distortions leading to enhanced economic activities in the official sector, corruption and the shadow economy then being substitutes. 7 This is a view that seems to be in line with Rose-Ackerman (1997) who notes that 'going underground is a substitute for bribery, although sometimes firms bribe officials in order to avoid official taxes,' (p. 21). Alternatively, Friedman et al. (2000) show that corruption and the shadow economy are positively related. When faced with weak economic institutions entrepreneurs go under-(countries that have traditionally relatively small public sectors and high tax morale), Enste (2000, 2002) . These estimates, however, need to be interpreted with some caution. See also footnote 39.
ground hiding their activities. As a consequence, tax revenues fall as well as the quality of public administration further reducing a firm's incentive to remain official. Using an inspector-tax payer model, Hindriks et al. (1998) also show that the shadow economy is a complement to corruption. This is because, in this case, the tax payer colludes with the inspector so the inspector underreports the tax liability of the tax payer in exchange for a bribe.
The empirical evidence, though limited, is in favor of corruption and the shadow economy being complements. Johnson et al.'s (1998) for combating corruption and the shadow economy is well recognized, to the best of our knowledge, no studies exist that attempt to articulate, and empirically estimate, the relationship treating the variables in question as inherently latent. This is the objective of this paper.
We set up a theoretical model which captures in a stark way the relationship between institutional quality, the shadow economy and corruption. The model relates to Shleifer and Vishny (1993) who analyze a bureaucracy issuing permits to perform some economic activity in exchange for bribes. They show that if the officials do not coordinate to extract bribes then the aggregate level of bribes will be too high from the point of view of the officials. The paper also relates to Bliss and Di Tella (1997) who show that corruption affects the number of firms in a free entry equilibrium and argue that the number of firms in the market place cannot be treated as exogenous. The model draws upon Choi and Thum (2004) with the key departure being in the explicit (but exogenous) specification of institutional quality. 12 The theoretical model shows that corruption and shadow economy are substitutes in the sense that the existence of the shadow economy reduces the propensity of officials to demand grafts from firms. It also shows that institutional quality, under a certain condition, may reduce both the magnitude of corruption and the size of the shadow economy. The predictions of the model are then tested and confirmed in a sample of 18 OECD countries. 13 To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that attempts to confirm a specific relationshiptreating these variables as inherently latent-between institutional quality, corruption and shadow economy.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we introduce a simple model that investigates the relationship between institutional quality, corruption and the shadow economy. In Section 3 we present the Structural Equation Model used to confirm the hypothesized relationship between institutional quality, corruption and the shadow economy. We also derive the scores of the latent endogenous variables and so derive an index of corruption and shadow economy in the 18 OECD countries. In Section 4 we present and discuss the results. Finally, in Section 5 we conclude.
account of studies on the hidden economy that have employed this approach. This approach has recently been used in Dreher et al. (2004) to derive an index of corruption based on around 100 countries.
A simple model
The model is familiar from Choi and Thum (2004) ; the key departure is in the explicit specification of institutional quality. Corruption is defined, following Shleifer and Vishny (1993) , 'as the sale by government officials of government property for personal gain' (p.
599
). There is a continuum of firms, each of which is characterized by an 'earning ability' parameter θ. The individual characteristic θ-distributed with cumulative probability F (θ) with F ′ (θ) ≥ 0-is known to the firms but, importantly, not to the officials. There are two markets in this economy; an official, within which corrupt officials operate, and the shadow market. What distinguishes the former from the latter market is the cost of operation. In particular, in order to operate in the official market, firms must purchase a permit which is government property from an official who is corrupt at price denoted by m. 14 To avoid expropriation by government officials firms can enter the shadow market.
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Entering the shadow market is, however, not cost free. The (expected) cost is the fine associated with the firm operating in the shadow economy. To minimize the possibility of getting caught firms typically scale down their degree of operation, an issue that we turn to shortly. Independent of their earning ability and market of operation, firms also incur fixed operating costs, such as the purchase of capital, denoted by ρ > 0.
Central to this paper is how institutional quality, in the presence of a free market equilibrium, affects both markets. It is not difficult for one to be convinced that the quality of the institution impacts differently in the two markets. Consider, for instance, the rule of law. One would expect, in this case, that an improvement in the rule of law reduces the incidence of illegal activities taking place in the two markets but it does so to different degrees since the nature of these activities are different (see footnote 15). To capture this it is assumed that institutional quality, denoted by e, improves the quality of the official market-denoted by q(e), 16 with 17 q ′ (e) > 0-and also the quality of the shadow market, denoted by σ(e), with σ ′ (e) > 0, but q(e) = σ(e) and q ′ (e) = σ ′ (e).
18
14 The officials so expropriate not only the firms but also the government property.
15 It is implicitly assumed that there is no rent extraction in the shadow economy. If firms are caught operating in the shadow economy they are fined but the revenues are not observed and so cannot be expropriated by the corrupt officials.
16 Another way to interpret this is as technology. The effectiveness of the institution in the two markets should be interpreted broadly to include, for instance, elements such as, among others, the complexity of the tax system and regulatory discretion. For a study on the effect of the complexity of the tax system on the size of the shadow economy see Schneider and Neck (1993) .
17 A derivative of a function of one variable is indicated by a prime and of many variables with a subscript.
18 It is feasible to endogenize the quality of the institution e, but this will add no further insights to There are two stages in the sequence of events. In the first stage, and for given institutional quality, the officials decide (anticipating the number of firms operating in the official market) what level of graft m to set in order to maximize graft revenues and in the second, for given level of graft, firms decide to either enter the official market, the shadow economy market or not to enter the markets at all. 19 To investigate the precise relationship between the corrupt and shadow markets and their relationship with the quality of the institutions, the strategy is to consider the behavior of public officials when the shadow market is not present and when it is. We start with the former.
Magnitude of corruption in the absence of the shadow market
A firm of earning ability θ that operates in the official economy has profits
The last term in (1) captures the monetary cost of institutional quality to a firm with earnings ability θ. This cost is increasing in e reflecting the fact that an improvement in institutional quality results in the typical firm being caught engaging in corrupt activities. 20 Clearly, a marginal firm will enter the official market if and only if it realizes non-negative profits that is, following from (1), if and only if
Condition (2), in turn, defines a cutoff level of θ, denoted by θ, such that all firms with earning ability above this will enter the official market by purchasing the permit at the cost of m. The proportion of firms, then, that will enter the market is 1 − F (θ). For notational convenience, denote
with G ′ (θ) ≤ 0 (to avoid uninteresting cases we take it throughout that G ′ < 0).
In the absence of a shadow economy, a corrupt official choosing m maximizes
the paper.
with the necessary condition being
Equation (5) implicitly defines the equilibrium level of graft m * (e, ρ). It is assumed that the second order condition, evaluated at m * (e, ρ), given by
is satisfied and so (5) has a unique solution. A property of (5) that will prove useful is
and so an increase in institutional quality reduces the equilibrium level of graft demanded by the officials. Total equilibrium graft revenues, denoted by R * , decrease with institutional quality. To see this, evaluate (4), using (5), and perturb to find
That total equilibrium graft revenues decrease with institutional quality is intuitive. For institutional quality, e, does not, as an envelope property, affect graft revenues through m * (e) but only through q(e); for given m * (e) an increase in e increases the cutoff level of θ reducing the official market and thereby graft revenues.
It is also interesting to observe that an improvement in institutional quality does not affect the equilibrium size of the official market, denoted by H. To see this, notice that the size of the official market is given by H(e) = G(θ(e)). Differentiating H, and evaluating using (5) and (8), gives, as an envelope property, H ′ (e) = 0. That an increase in institutional quality reduces revenues (but leaves the official market unchanged) is perhaps not surprising. But it does serve as a useful benchmark to compare against the equilibrium outcomes in the presence of the shadow economy. This is what we turn to next.
Magnitude of corruption in the presence of the shadow market
Consider now an economy in which there is an underground sector. As noted previously, if a firm enters the shadow market it pays no graft but it requires to scale down the 21 Throughout this subsection the dependence of the functions on ρ (being fixed) is suppressed.
level of the economic activity so as not to be detected. To capture this in a simple way, it is assumed that for a given σ(e), the cost of entering the shadow economy is θσ(e).
Denoting variables pertaining to the shadow economy with a superscript s, profits are given by
It is also natural to assume that the cost of entering the shadow market is not too high that is, σ(e) < 1. Consider now the choice that a typical firm, with characteristic θ, faces. A simple comparison between (1) and (10) reveals that if θ ≥ mq(e)/σ(e) then this firm participates in corruption, whereas if ρ/(1 − σ(e)) ≤ θ < mq(e)/σ(e) then it enters the shadow economy. With a sufficiently low θ < ρ/(1 − σ(e)) the firm makes, following (10), negative profits and hence ceases activity altogether.
Denoting total graft by R s officials, choosing m, and anticipating the market equilibrium, maximize
with necessary condition
which implicitly defines the optimal graft m s * (e) with, for later use,
where ε h ≡ h ′ (e)e/h > 0 denotes the elasticity of h = q, σ with respect to institutional quality e. Equation (14) reveals that the change in equilibrium graft, due to a change in institutional quality e, takes the opposite sign of ε q − ε σ . This is intuitive. Consider, for instance, ε q > ε σ . In this case corruption is easier to be detected, relative to the illegal activities taking place in the shadow market, and so the public officials respond to an increase in institutional quality by reducing the level of graft demanded, that is m s * ′ < 0. Analogous reasoning applies to ε q < ε σ .
It is now straightforward to see that the equilibrium level of graft, denoted by R s * , when the shadow economy exists is less than the level of graft when the shadow economy does not exist that is, m s * (e) < m * (e). To see this evaluate (11) at the optimal level of graft m * (e) and then, starting from m * (e), consider a small change dm to find
with the inequality following upon σ(e) < 1. Clearly, then, since R s * is strictly concave in m, m s * (e) < m * (e) and so optimal graft under the existence of the shadow economy is smaller than without. This is intuitive. The shadow economy, for given institutional quality, imposes a constraint on the officials. When firms face a high graft, they have the option of going underground. The lower m s * (e), the more firms enter the official economy. Hence, when the shadow economy exists, corruption is lower and so the official economy is larger implying that the shadow market and the official economy are complements.
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What about total graft revenues? One would expect that these depend on the relative magnitudes of ε q and ε σ . Indeed, perturbing optimal graft R s * , and evaluating at m s * using (12), one obtains
and so, with G ′ < 0, total graft revenues decrease (increase) in institutional quality when ε q > ε σ ( ε q < ε σ ). The intuition of this is similar to the one given when the shadow economy was not present. An increase in institutional quality does not affect equilibrium revenues through m s * but only via the cutoff level of θ thereby reducing the proportion of firms entering the official market. 23 Interestingly, however, improved institutional quality does not affect the size (number of firms) of the official market but it does affect the magnitude of graft revenues. This is for the same reason as that given above, but modified here to incorporate the shadow market. Specifically, with ε q > ε σ (ε q < ε σ ), the cutoff level of θ increases (decreases) thereby reducing (increasing) the number of firms entering in the official market. But this is not the end of the story. Following (14), to maintain maximum graft revenues, officials reduce (increase) the equilibrium level of graft undoing the change in the cutoff level of θ. Thus, overall, the size of the official market remains the same.
An increase in institutional quality, e, however, unambiguously reduces the size of the shadow economy. To see this notice first that, following the discussion in the preceding paragraph, with the equilibrium size of the official market being unaffected by institutional quality, there are no firms contemplating entering the official market after an improvement in institutional quality has taken place. What institutional quality affects, however, is the marginal firm that decides to stay in the shadow market or of exiting the market completely. It is straightforward to show that the size of the shadow economy decreases with changes in institutional quality, e. To see this, denoting the proportion of firms entering the shadow economy by S(e) = F (ρ/(1 − σ(e))), we thus have S ′ (e) = F ′ ρσ ′ (e)/ (1 − σ(e)) 2 < 0. Summarizing the preceding discussion: relative to the shadow economy, in the sense that ε q > ε σ , then a further improvement in institutional quality reduces the magnitude of corruption. Officials, anticipating that the official market is less profitable for firms, reduce the level of graft demanded. But the opposite is also true. If the effectiveness of the institutions is biased towards combating the shadow economy, ε q < ε σ , then institutional quality may exacerbate corruption. The preceding analysis has emphasized that:
(i ) the corruption and shadow markets are substitutes in the sense that the existence of the shadow market is associated with smaller levels of graft;
(ii ) the effect of institutional quality on the shadow market is unambiguously negative whereas;
(iii ) the effect of institutional quality on the magnitude of corruption is ambiguous and depends on the relative effectiveness of institutional quality on the two markets.
We now take the model to the data. We start with a description of the methodology used. As briefly touched upon in Section 1, the difficulty with the variables of corruption, the shadow economy and institutional quality is that they are inherently latent since they is 'becoming a powerful approach' to these problems, Giles (1999, p. 372) and, applied to the present context, is outlined in the next Section.
A Structural Equation Model
Structural Equation Modelling allows a set of relationships between one or more independent variables and one or more dependent variables to be examined. Both independent and dependent variables can be either latent variables (factors) or measured variables (indicators). The underlying assumption is that the observed variables are perfectly correlated (or at least nearly so) with the latent variables that they measure. 
General model specification

It is instructive to provide the general specification of the model. A Structural Equation
Model has the following form: Also E(δ) = 0 q×1 and E(ǫ) = 0 p×1 . To simplify matters x, y, ξ and η are written as deviations from their means, Bollen (1989) . To incorporate cause indicators into the current model structure (see below) one needs to define each indicator, x i , as equal to a latent variable ξ that is x = Iξ, 26 where x is a vector of cause indicators.
25 Of course all measures or abstract factors have far from perfect associations with the factor. 26 The observed x variables, so, contain no measurement error.
The hypothesis of the model is that Σ = Σ(φ). Estimation is performed by choosing φ (the vector that contains the model parameters) minimizing the maximum likelihood
where p + q is the number of measured variables.
Following equations (17) and (18), the implied covariance matrix is
where,
where the equalities in (23) and (25) follow from substituting the reduced form of equation (19) that is, η = (I − B) −1 (Γξ + ζ). Θ ǫ is the p × p covariance matrix of ǫ, Θ δ is the q × q covariance matrix of δ, and Φ is the n × n covariance matrix of the latent factors ξ. (I − B) is required to be non-singular and so invertible.
Analysis of the covariance matrix of observed variables leads to unstandardized coefficients that depend upon the units in which the variables are scaled. To compare the effects of two or more variables on the same dependent variable when they have different units of measurement, the coefficients are standardized as followŝ
where the superscript s represents a standardized coefficient, i is the dependent variable, j is the independent, andσ ii ,σ jj are the model predicted variances of the i th and j th variables. Once the hypothesized relationship between the variables has been identified and estimated, the latent variable scores η j for each country j = 1, . . . J can be obtained following the procedure suggested by Jöreskog (2000) .
The analysis outlined above allows us to decompose the effects of one variable on another into direct, indirect, and total effects. These two endogenous latent variables are both predicated by an exogenous latent variable, capturing institutional quality ('QUALITY'-ξ 3 ). The exogenous latent variable 27 Total and indirect effects are only defined under certain conditions. A sufficient condition for the total effects to exist is that the largest eigenvalue of the matrix B is less than one, Bollen (1989) . 28 For the effects of ξ on y and x as well as of η on η, y and x see Bollen (1989) , Table 8 .9.
29 It is common practise to represent the measured variables (indicators) by squares and the latent variables (factors) by circles. The hypothesized relationship between the variables are indicated by lines. Straight single-headed arrows represent one-way influences from the variable at the arrow base to the variable to which the arrow points.
30 To avoid confusion, and where appropriate, we provide both the name of the variables and their symbolic representation in Subsection 3.1.
is indicated by a rule of law index ('LAW'-x 3 ) and an index of government effectiveness ('EFFECTIVENESS'-x 4 ).
31 Finally, the directional link between CORRUPTION and SHADOW tests the relationship between these two endogenous latent variables.
32
As predicted by the theoretical model, we expect a direct relation between QUALITY, SHADOW and CORRUPTION. We turn now to the results.
Results
Structural equation model estimates
To increase the number of observations the data have been averaged over the period 1998-2002. The sample, driven by data availability, covers 18 OECD countries. As noted in Subsection 3.1, prior to estimation the data are standardized. 33 Figure 2 presents the estimated coefficients. To derive the t-ratios for the indicator variables, one of the coefficients of the indicators must be normalized to 1. We have chosen to normalize the estimated parameters with respect to CURRENCY; this should be taken to mean higher currency circulation relative to GDP reflects a higher unofficial economy. The indicator variables are statistically significant at the 10 percent level at least, with higher TAX indicating a smaller shadow economy. This is in line with the evidence found by Schneider and Enste (2000) . The indicator LABOUR follows from the fact that a decline in women labor force participation in the official economy can be seen, assuming constant labour force participation, as an indication of increased activity in the shadow economy, Schneider and Enste (2000) . For CORRUPTION, TI is an obvious (perception based) indicator. Following Djankov et al. (2002) , PROCEDURES (that cover direct costs of time associated with meeting government requirements that a start-up must bear before it can operate legally) should be correlated with CORRUPTION, too. The indicators of QUALITY seem to be obvious choices.
32 From a theoretical point of view other variables could measure the underlying constructs equally well. In the empirical estimation other variables have been tried out. The final set of variables is the one that produces the best fit. Correlations between the error terms, where this increases model fit, have also been accounted for.
33 All variables with their definitions and sources can be found in the Appendix. All estimations have been performed with LISREL V. 8.5.4.
following the normalization of the estimated coefficient with respect to the variable LAW-and significant at the 1 percent level. These indices range from zero to one, with values close to one indicating a better fit.
Structural equation model evaluation
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The squared multiple correlations for the structural equations are 0.51, and so moderately high, for SHADOW and, very high, 0.94 for CORRUPTION. Based on these goodnessof-fit statistics, we conclude that the model fits the data fairly well.
Direct and indirect effects
The path analysis in Figure 1 , as noted in Section 3.1, allows us to distinguish three types of effects: direct, indirect and total. The direct effect is the influence of one variable on another that is unmediated by any other variable in the path diagram. The indirect effects of a variable are mediated by at least one intervening variable. The total effect of institutional quality captured by LAW on the latent variable SHADOW is γ 13 = −0.65, and is significant at the 1 percent level. The interpretation of this is that a marginal improvement in institutional quality reduces the latent score of the shadow economy by 34 Values of the RMSEA less than 0.05 indicate good fit, values as high as 0.08 represent reasonable fit, values from 0.08 to 0.10 indicate mediocre fit, and those greater than 0.10 indicate poor fit (MacCallum et al. 1996) . and is significant at the 1 percent level, implying that a marginal increase in the rule of law reduces the magnitude of corruption by 1.11, as measured by the latent score.
The estimated model, therefore, shows that an increase in institutional quality affects negatively both the shadow economy and corruption markets in OECD countries. The interpretation of this is that, in the sample of OECD countries, institutions seem to work better in combating corruption relative to underground economy. Turning now to the total effect of institutional quality, denoted by T η 2 ξ 3 , on CORRUPTION is given by
and is significant at the 1 percent level. Thus, a marginal increase in QUALITY reduces CORRUPTION by −0.950.
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The coefficient (β 21 = −0.25) of the link between the two endogenous latent (COR-RUPTION and SHADOW) variables is significant at 1 percent level implying that the existence of SHADOW reduces the magnitude of CORRUPTION. This, therefore, is consistent with the shadow economy and corruption being substitutes.
We turn now to deriving the scores for the latent variables for the countries in our sample. These latent scores allow us to provide a ranking of the shadow economy and the extent of corruption for the countries in our sample.
Latent scores (indices)
To derive the latent scores, as noted in Subsection 3.1, we adopt the procedure suggested by Jöreskog (2000) . The results are presented in Table 1 .
37 Table 1 here.
As can be seen in Table 1 , the country with the smallest shadow economy is Canada (with normalized index value 0), followed by Hungary (0.390), and Belgium (0.144).
Among the countries in our sample, Mexico and the Slovak Republic have the largest unofficial sectors, with 1 and 0.440, respectively. In terms of corruption, Finland is the least corrupt country (with normalized index value 0) followed by New Zealand (0.081), and the UK (0.204). The most corrupt country is Mexico (with normalized index of 1), Table 2 here.
Taken together the estimates from the Structural Equation Model are consistent with the theoretical framework, that institutional quality affects negatively the shadow economy and corruption both directly and indirectly and that corruption and the shadow economy are substitutes.
Concluding remarks
This paper has taken a step towards understanding the relationship between institutional quality, corruption and the shadow market. It developed a simple model and confirmed existing results, associated with Choi and Thum (2004) , that corruption and shadow markets are substitutes in the sense that the existence of the shadow market is associated with smaller levels of graft. It has also been shown that (i) the effect of institutional quality on the shadow market is unambiguously negative whereas, (ii ) the effect of institutional quality on the magnitude of corruption is ambiguous and depends on the relative effectiveness of institutional quality on the two markets. These predictions were 38 Since indices comparable to the index for SHADOW do not exist one should exercise caution in providing correlations between those indices and the index for SHADOW derived in this paper. This is because studies that are based on single latent models potentially are picking up aspects of corruption in their shadow economy measure.
39 Two observations are in order here. Firstly, one might argue that the correlation of the derived index for CORRUPTION with TI is high because TI appears as an indicator of the latent variable of CORRUPTION. Yet, other indicators are a priori of equal importance. What the result here indicates is that perceived corruption-at least in the OECD countries-is highly correlated with actual corruption. This corroborates using the TI index as index for corruption in those countries. Secondly, one might be tempted to benchmark the indices SHADOW and CORRUPTION to existing estimates of the shadow economy and corruption. Though feasible, this benchmarking exercise suffers from a choice-bias, and is, in the present context, of limited use. tested using data from 18 OECD countries. The empirical estimation confirmed the prediction that institutional quality reduces the shadow economy and corruption. The total effect of institutional quality on corruption was estimated to be negative and significant. Friedman et al. (2000) ; CI is the Corruption Index of Friedman et al. (2000) ; CIM is the Corruption Index based on the full model of 1997 of Dreher et al. (2004) ; and CC is the Control of Corruption of Kaufmann et al. (2003) . developing an environment in which fair and predictable rules form the basis for social and economic interactions. Source: Kaufmann et al. ( , 2003 .
EFFECTIVENESS: This variable combines perceptions of the quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government's commitment to policies into a single grouping. The main focus is on 'inputs' required for the government to be able to produce and implement good policies. Source: Kaufmann et al. ( , 2003 .
